The Convention as a Living Instrument:Rooted in the Past, Looking to the Future by Bjorge, Eirik
                          Bjorge, E. (2017). The Convention as a Living Instrument: Rooted in the
Past, Looking to the Future. Human Rights Law Journal, 36(7-12), 243-255.
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via N.P. Engel Verlag
at http://www.hrlj.info/index.php/archives/title-pages/14-title/187-2014-2017 . Please refer to any applicable
terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
2016] 243
THE CONVENTION AS A LIVING INSTRUMENT
ROOTED IN THE PAST, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
by Eirik Bjorge, Bristol
Introduction  ................................................................................. 243
 I. The Living Instrument Approach is not Exclusive 
to the European Court of Human Rights  .......................... 244
 II. Where Next for the Living Instrument?  ............................ 248
  1. Systemic Integration and the Living Instrument 
Approach  ........................................................................... 248
  2. European Consensus  ........................................................ 251
  3. Restricting the Convention’s Protection through 
Evolutionary Interpretation?  ........................................... 251
  4. Extraterritorial Derogations?  .......................................... 252
  5. Are there Special Rules for the Interpretation of 
Issues of Jurisdiction?  ....................................................... 252
  6. Was the Interpretative Result in Hassan Supported by 
the Subsequent Practice of States? .................................. 253
 III. Conclusion  ............................................................................. 255
Appendix: Abbreviations  ........................................................... 255
Introduction
This article is inspired by two refl ections. First, when a 
great international judge steps down, we are afforded the 
opportunity to look back and analyse their work in ways 
which were not possible during their tenure. In that regard 
Hegel advises us that the owl of Minerva takes wing only 
with the onset of dusk. 1  That is taken to mean that it is only 
after a period has closed that we can engage in academic 
critique and appraisal making explicit the ideas and beliefs 
that drove that era but could not be fully articulated until it 
was over. No doubt such crepuscular refl ections would not 
be in Judge Mahoney’s spirit if they did not allow criticism 
in addition to approbation. 
Second, when individuals from different backgrounds 
come together in international forums such as the 
European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg (‘the 
Strasbourg Court’), they represent on the one hand their 
respective national traditions; but on the other hand it is, 
as Sir Ian Brownlie once said of Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
a part of the calling of the international lawyer to ‘avoid 
insisting on some preconceived personal or national 
* Dr Eirik Bjorge, Senior Lecturer, University of Bristol. The 
following text is an expanded version (footnotes added) of the 
oral presentation made on 9 September 2016. For the reader’s 
convenience a list of selected abbreviations can be found below at 
p. 255.
1 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, (H.B. 
Nisbet tr., CUP, 1991) 23.
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viewpoint’.2 That, it can also confi dently be said, fairly sums 
up the work in the Strasbourg Court of Judge Mahoney. 
He has always understood that the Convention is a part 
of the larger universe of public international law, or that 
the Convention, to use a turn of phrase coined in 1980 by 
the International Court of Justice, ‘does not operate in a 
vacuum’ but rather ‘in the context of a wider framework 
of legal rules of which it forms only a part’.3 Under the 
tutelage of Registrar Mahoney, these were the exact words 
used by the Grand Chamber of in Al-Adsani v. United 
Kingdom: ‘the Convention ... cannot be interpreted in a 
vacuum’.4 On this approach, even the language in which 
judicial cooperation is couched is shared as between 
different international courts.
The article has two parts, the fi rst one of which concerns 
especially the living instrument approach and the domestic 
courts of the Member States of the Council of Europe; it 
asks the question, ‘How special is the living instrument 
approach?’5 The second part moves to the international 
level, asking the question, ‘Where next for the living 
instrument?’6 This part engages critically with certain 
decisions of the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court, 
especially Banković v. Belgium7 and Hassan v. United 
Kingdom,8 which, one suspects, bear the discreet signature 
of Registrar – as he fi rst was – and Judge – as he later 
became – Paul Mahoney.
I.  The Living Instrument Approach is Not Exclusive 
to the Strasbourg Court
It is a well-known systemic aspect of the ECHR rights 
that the rights of the Convention must ‘be analysed in the 
light of the principle, fi rmly rooted in the Court’s case-law, 
that the Convention is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.9 ‘The 
meaning and content of the provisions of the Convention 
will be understood’, as Sir Humphrey Waldock once put it, 
‘as intended to evolve in response to changes in legal or 
social concepts’.10
In common with the practice of other international 
courts and tribunals,11 the European Court of Human 
Rights will, when the treaty text to be interpreted invites 
it, rely on evolutionary interpretation or, in its own 
idiom, the ‘living instrument’ doctrine.12 The evolutionary 
interpretation of treaties has been defi ned in the following 
way: where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, 
the parties necessarily having been aware that the meaning 
of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where 
the treaty has been entered into for a very long period, 
the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have 
intended those terms to have an evolving meaning.13 Thus 
the words ‘evolutionary interpretation’, the International 
Court of Justice explained in Navigational and Related 
Rights, refer to: 
situations in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of 
the treaty was, or may be presumed to have been, to give 
the terms used – or some of them – a meaning or content 
capable of evolving, not one fi xed once and for all, so as 
to make allowance for, among other things, developments 
in international law.14
Such an approach is not without a mooring in what 
international law calls the intentions of the parties to 
the ECHR: it is therefore no more of a threat to State 
sovereignty than other forms of interpretation.15 The 
approach taken by the Strasbourg Court is one which 
takes seriously the intention on the part of the Contracting 
States, as set out in the Preamble to the Convention, that 
not only the ‘maintenance’ but also the ‘further realisation’ 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms is incumbent 
upon the states members, and by extension also on the 
Strasbourg Court. The Strasbourg institutions understood 
early on the necessity of seeking ‘the interpretation that is 
most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve 
the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the 
greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the 
Parties’.16 
Increasingly, this requirement is taken seriously by the 
domestic courts, too,17 the Swiss Federal Tribunal having 
already in 1975 taken the view that: ‘[d]urch ihre Aufzählung 
übernimmt und entwickelt die Konvention Bestimmungen 
weiter, welche zahlreiche Staatsverfassungen im Abschnitt 
über die Freiheitsrechte enthalten oder welche die 
Vertragsstaaten als ungeschriebene Verfassungsrechte 
anerkennen.’18
It is against this backdrop that the Strasbourg Court 
has put such a premium upon the object and purpose of 
the Convention, that is, on safeguarding ‘not rights that 
are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and 
effective’.19 The nexus between the intentions of the parties 
and the object and purpose of the Convention was given an 
accurate description by Judge Fitzmaurice, when he pointed 
out in Belgian Police that ‘the object and purpose of a treaty 
2 I. Brownlie, “The Calling of the International Lawyer: Sir 
Humphrey Waldock and his Work”, (1983) 54 British Yearbook 
of International Law 7, 40-42; for a similar French perspective see 
J. Combacau, “Paul Reuter, le juriste”, (1989) 35 Annuaire français 
de droit international 7, 14-16.
3 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between 
the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion of 20 December 1980, 
I.C.J. Rep. 1980, p. 73, 76 at para. 10.
4 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, 21 November 
2001, at § 55 = 23 HRLJ 39 at p. 45 (2002).
5 See e.g. P. Mahoney, “The Relationship between the Strasbourg 
Court and the National Courts”, (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 
at p. 568.
6 See e.g. P. Mahoney & R. Kondak, “Common Ground: 
A Starting Point or Destination for Comparative-Law Analysis 
by the European Court of Human Rights”, in: M. Andenas & 
D. Fairgrieve (eds.), Courts and Comparative Law, (OUP, 2015) 119.
7 Banković v. Belgium [GC], no. 52207/99, 12 December 2001 = 
22 HRLJ 453 (2001).
8Hassan v. United Kindom [GC], no. 29750/09, 16 September 
2014.
9 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, 25 April 1978, at § 31; 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, 23 February 
2012 at § 175 = 32 HRLJ 363 at p. 380 (2012).
10  H. Waldock, “The Evolution of Human Rights Concepts and 
the Application of the European Convention on Human Rights”, 
in: Mélanges Reuter, (Pedone, 1981) 547. Also: M. Sørensen, “Do 
the Rights Set forth in the European Convention on Human 
Rights in 1950 have the Same Signifi cance in 1975? Report 
presented by Max Sørensen to the Fourth International Colloquy 
about the European Convention on Human Rights, Rome 
5-8 November 1975”: reprinted in Max Sørensen: A Bibliography, 
(Aarhus University Press, 1988) 23, 54-55; H.J. Cremer, “Regeln 
der Konventionsinterpretation”, in: R. Grote & T. Marauhn (eds.), 
EMRK/GG: Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deut-
schen Grundrechtsschutz, (2nd edn., Mohr Siebeck, 2013) 193-247.
11  See E. Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties, 
(OUP, 2014).
12  Tyrer (supra note 9).
13  Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa 
Rica v. Nicaragua), I.C.J. Rep. 2009, p. 213, 243 at para. 66.
14  Ibid. 242 at para. 64.
15  See M. Andenas, ‘Sovereignty’ in C. Baudenbacher (ed.), 
Fundamental Principles of the EEA – EEA-ities, (Springer, 
forthcoming autumn 2017).
16  Wemhoff v. Germany, no. 2122/64, 27 June 1968, at § 8.
17  See the UK, French, and German examples below.
18  Diskont- und Handelsbank AG (1975) 101 Entscheidungen 
des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts at pp. 66, 69. See also below 
p. 259, note 15.
19  Airey v. United Kingdom, no. 6289/73, 9 October 1979, at 
§ 24; Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08, 12 September 2012, at 
§§ 182 and 195 = 32 HRLJ 129 at pp. 149 and 150 (2012).
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are not something that exist in abstracto: they follow from 
and are closely bound up with the intentions of the parties’.20
This approach is shared by the law of treaties more 
generally. It is, as Judge Higgins has pointed out, the ‘wider 
principle – intention of the parties, refl ected by reference to 
the objects and purpose – that guides the law of treaties’.21 
Thus the Arbitral Tribunal in Iron Rhine, chaired by Judge 
Higgins, in making an evolutionary interpretation of the 
treaty terms of the treaty at issue in the case, observed 
that ‘an evolutive interpretation, which would ensure an 
application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of 
its object and purpose, will be preferred’.22
This interpretative approach has a long pedigree in the 
domestic jurisprudence of the French, German and UK 
courts.23 Whilst their approaches differ, as a function of 
legal culture and history, there is nevertheless a striking 
degree of similarity, both between the different domestic 
approaches and between the domestic and international 
approaches. 
First, on the basis of long held views as to the interaction 
between legislation and the judicial function, the UK 
courts interpret statutes taking a contemporaneous 
and purposive approach as opposed to a historical and 
strictly textual one.24 Lord Bingham in Quintavalle set 
out the common law’s view of the relation between the 
intention of Parliament and evolutions subsequent to the 
passing of the law. There was no inconsistency between 
the rule that statutory language retains the meaning it 
had when Parliament used it and the rule that a statute 
is ‘always speaking’. The words ‘always speaking’ go back 
to the Victorian draftsman, Lord Thring, who instructed 
draftsmen to draft legislation so that ‘an Act of Parliament 
should be deemed to be always speaking’.25 Against this 
background, Lord Bingham observed that:
If Parliament, however, long ago, passed an Act applicable 
to dogs, it could not properly be interpreted to apply to 
cats; but it could properly be held to apply to animals 
which were not regarded as dogs when the Act was 
passed but are so regarded now. The meaning of ‘cruel 
and unusual punishments’ has not changed over the years 
since 1689, but many punishments which were not then 
thought to fall within that category would now be held 
to do so.26
The question arising both in connection with 
evolutionary interpretations by domestic courts both of 
domestic instruments and instruments which are – or have 
a connection to – instruments of international law will be 
closely bound up with the role to be played by the judiciary 
under the constitutional principle of the separation of 
powers. Lady Hale made this point in relation to domestic 
developments of the level of protection that, in respect of 
the domestic legal order, fl ows from the ECHR:
if we are confronted with a question which has not yet 
arisen in the European Court, we have to work out the 
answer for ourselves, taking into account, not only the 
principles which have been developed in Strasbourg, but 
also the principles of our own law and constitution.27
New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General28 offers 
another instructive common law example, which blends 
domestic and international sources in an attractive manner. 
In this case, from the New Zealand Court of Appeal, the 
court made an evolutionary interpretation of provisions 
contained in the Treaty of Waitangi, a convention signed 
in 1840 between the Maori and Great Britain. President 
Sir Robin Cooke, later to be ennobled as Lord Cooke and 
take up his seat in the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lords, observed that ‘the treaty has to be seen as an 
embryo rather than a fully developed and integrated set of 
ideas’; the correct approach would be to interpret the treaty 
‘widely and effectively and as a living instrument taking 
account of the subsequent developments of international 
human rights norms’.29 
In France, the courts have taken much the same approach. 
A classic examples is the line of cases from the Cour de 
cassation, in which it made an evolutionary interpretation 
of Article 2279 of the Civil Code.30 Article 2279 provides 
that: ‘En fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre’. When the 
article was drafted, in 1804, non-corporeal property was 
not considered, as that did not at the time exist in the way 
in which it would come into existence in the nineteenth 
century. Thus the question  arose as to whether such 
movables were to be seen as being covered by the terms 
of the article. The Cour de cassation determined that these 
later phenomena were in fact covered, as the term ‘meubles’ 
was of itself capable of generalization and thus applicable 
to all types of movables.31 Similarly, in Jand’heur the Cour 
de cassation interpreted Article 1384(1) of the Civil Code 
20  Separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, National Union of 
Belgian Police, no. 4464/70, 27 October 1975, at I. 9. (i).
21  R. Higgins, “Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal 
Rule in International Law”, in: Theory of International Law at 
the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzystof 
Skubiszewski, (Kluwer, 1996) 181. Also: Territorial Dispute (Libya/
Chad), I.C.J. Rep. 1994, pp. 21, 23; Lighthouses Case between France 
and Greece, Judgment (1934) PCIJ Series A/B No. 62 p. 27; Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J. Rep. 1971, pp. 16, 35 at para. 66; Aegean 
Sea Continental Shelf, I.C.J. Rep. 1978, pp. 3, 22 at para. 52; Dispute 
between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, (1977) 
21 RIAA pp. 53, 231; Young Loan Arbitration, (1980) 59 ILR 494, 
531; Dispute concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence 
(“La Bretagne”) (Canada/France), (1986) 82 ILR 591, 659, at 
para. 67; Decision regarding delimitation of the border between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, (2002) 25 RIAA pp. 83, 110.
22  Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren 
Rijn”) (Belgium v. Netherlands), (2005) 27 RIAA pp. 35, 73 (italics 
added).
23  See E. Bjorge, Domestic Application of the ECHR: Courts as 
Faithful Trustees, (OUP, 2015) 18-22 and 131-154, which analyses 
this domestic case-law in greater detail.
24  J. Bell, “Interpreting Statutes over Time”, in: F. Ost & M. van 
Hoecke (eds.), Temps et droit: le droit a-t-il pour vocation de durer?, 
(Bruylant, 1998) 31-34: B. Hale, “Common Law and Convention 
Law: The Limits to Interpretation”, [2011] European Human 
Rights Law Review 534, 535-536.
25  H. Thring, Practical Legislation, (John Murray, 1902) 83. Also: 
R. Cross, J. Bell, and G. Engle, Cross: Statutory Interpretation, (3rd 
edn., Butterworths, 1995) 51.
26  R. v. Secretary of State for Health ex p Quintavalle, [2003] 
UKHL 13 at para. 9 (Lord Bingham); at paras. 21-23 (Lord Steyn). 
Also: River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, (1877) 2 App. 
Cas. 743, 763; Grant v. Southwestern and County Properties Ltd, 
[1975] Ch 185; Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Ltd, 
[2001] 1 AC 27 (HL); R. v. Ireland, [1998] AC 147 (HL); Goodes v. 
East Sussex County Council, [2000] UKHL 34; Birmingham City 
Council v. Oakley, [2000] UKHL 59; R. v. Bristol City Council, ex 
p Everett, [1999] EWCA Civ 869; Royal College of Nursing of the 
United Kingdom v. Department for Health and Social Security, 
[1981] AC 800 (HL); McCarten Turkington Breen (A Firm) v. 
Times Newspapers Ltd, [2001] 2 AC 277 (HL); R. v. Brittain, [1972] 
1 QB 357 (QB); R. v. R. (Rape: Marital Exemption), [1992] 1 AC 
599 (HL); Yemshaw (Appellant) v. London Borough of Hounslow 
(Respondent), [2011] UKSC 3 at para. 56 (Lady Hale).
27  Moohan & Another v. The Lord Advocate, [2014] UKSC 67 at 
para. 53 (Lady Hale).
28  New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, [1987] 
1 NZLR 641.
29  Ibid. 655-656 and 663.
30  See e.g. Cour de cassation (1re chambre civile), 20 October 
1982.
31  F. Terré, Introduction générale au droit, (9th edn., Dalloz, 
2012) 472; J. Bell, “Interpreting Statutes over Time”, in: F. Ost & 
M. van Hoecke (eds.), Temps et droit: le droit a-t-il pour vocation de 
durer ?, (Bruylant, 1998) 34-35.
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in the light of is broader object and in accordance with 
latter-day developments.32 What avocat général Matter 
said in his conclusions applies to the jurisprudence of the 
Conseil d’État as much as to the Cour de cassation:
la jurisprudence opère une œuvre créatrice : qu’en 
présence de tous les changements opérés dans les 
idées, dans les mœurs, dans les institutions, dans l’état 
économique de la France, on doit adapter libéralement, 
humainement, le texte aux réalités et aux exigences de la 
vie moderne. 
The Conseil d’État takes a similarly evolutionary and 
teleologic approach to interpretation.33 This is true not 
least where the human element invoked by Matter is in 
play. Thus commissaire du gouvernement Ronny Abraham 
(later to take up his seat as Judge and then President of 
the International Court of Justice) in his conclusions in 
GISTI, adopted by the Conseil d’État,34 argued that the 
term ‘minor’ in a 1985 French-Algerian extradition treaty 
must not to be constructed according to a ‘strictly literal 
interpretation’ as this would be ‘contrary to the objectives 
sought by the negotiators of the 1985 convention’.35
The same is the case in German law, where for example 
the Federal Constitutional Court in a line of authorities 
beginning in the early 1950s developed German constitutional 
law by reliance upon a doctrine of constitutional change, 
‘Verfassungswandel’,36 according to which terms in the Basic 
Law were interpreted evolutionarily:
a constitutional provision can undergo a change of 
meaning, if in its scope of application new facts appear 
or known facts by way of development appear in new 
constellations or take on a new meaning. [Author’s 
translation].37
Nonetheless the fact that the Strasbourg Court has 
taken this approach might suggest that the national courts 
would have trouble keeping up, insofar as they are bound 
to apply a set of rights which are, on the Strasbourg Court’s 
own admission, ‘dynamic and evolutive’.38 Some problems 
will always arise, as might also be the case domestically, as 
between lower courts and a supreme court. As Bernard 
Stirn, President of the Section du contentieux (the Judicial 
Section) of the Conseil d’État, has put it, ‘the evolutionary 
and progressive jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, the role of which has been gradually 
asserted to the point that it is now quite extensive, has 
given rise to a solid system of collective protection of 
fundamental rights, which has become one of the key 
components of the European legal order.’39
Lord Bingham’s dictum in Ullah, that the national courts 
must ‘keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it 
evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less’,40 for a 
long time set the tone for the UK courts’ approach to the 
matter. The approach was called the mirror principle.41 
Its operation was well summarised by Lady Hale in 
McCaughey,42 where her Ladyship stated that it could not 
have been Parliament’s intention that the Convention 
rights enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998 were to 
remain set in stone as they were when the act was passed 
or when it came into force. Rather, it must have been 
intended, she continued,
that the national courts would, at the very least, ‘keep pace 
with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time’. 
If the evolutive interpretation of the Convention rights 
means that they now mean something different from what 
they meant when the 1998 Act was passed, then it is our 
duty to give effect to their current meaning, rather than to 
the one they had before.43
 As the Ullah approach has developed over time, there 
is at present room for the UK courts to go beyond the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court: but they must not 
fall short of its standards.44
The question has not really come to a head in the same 
way before the German courts. This is due to the high (and 
in no way static) standards of the protection which follow 
from the Basic Law.45 Boussouar and Planchenault are 
examples of the approach taken by the French courts in 
this regard.46 In his conclusions, adopted by the Assemblée 
of the Conseil d’État in its judgment, commissaire du 
gouvernement Mattias Guyomar held that taking into 
account the European jurisprudence to a certain measure 
would mean going beyond what the Court requires in 
the scope of its control a posteriori and in concreto: ‘To 
refuse to overturn the decisions which are attacked today 
would be tantamount to accepting to close one’s eyes and 
to waiting for Strasbourg to open them for one.’47 Thus, 
the Conseil d’État, in the context of Article 13 and the 
right of prisoners to an effective remedy in contesting 
administrative decisions against them, developed its 
understanding of the Convention rights beyond what the 
Strasbourg Court had done.48
As will be seen, therefore, the domestic courts of France, 
Germany and the UK have been quite prepared to follow 
the Strasbourg Court’s lead as regards the ‘living’ character 
of the Convention rights.49 As is clear not least from the 
French and UK approach, the domestic courts seem to 
have done so on the assumption that not to do so would 
have meant not taking seriously the underlying tenets of 
the system of the ECHR.
32  Cour de cassation, 13 February 1930, Jand’heur c. Les Galeries 
belfortaises.
33  Y. Gaudemet, Les méthodes du juge administratif, (LGDJ, 
1972) 66-70 and 136-143.
34  Conseil d’État, 29 June 1990, GISTI.
35  Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Abraham, in 
GISTI, (1990) 94 RGDIP 882, 906-907.
36  See A. Voßkuhle, “Gibt es und wozu nutzt eine Lehre vom 
Verfassungswandel?”, (2004) 43 Der Staat 450; K. Larenz, Methoden-
lehre der Rechtswissenschaft, (6th edn., Springer, 1991) 328-339.
37  BVerfGE 2, 380 (401): “eine Verfassungsbestimmung [kann] 
einen Bedeutungswandel erfahren, wenn in ihrem Bereich neue, 
nicht vorausgesehene Tatbestände auftauchen oder bekannte 
Tatbestände durch ihre Einordnung in den Gesamtablauf einer 
Entwicklung in neuer Beziehung oder Bedeutung erscheinen”. 
Also: BVerfGE 3, 407 (422).
38  Goodwin v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, 11 July 2002 
at § 74 = 23 HRLJ 72 (2002); Stafford v. United Kingdom [GC], 
no. 46295/99, 28 May 2002 at § 68.
39  B. Stirn, Towards a European Public Law, (translated from 
French and edited by E. Bjorge, OUP, 2017) 67.
40  R. (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator, [2004] UKHL 26 at para. 20 
(Lord Bingham).
41  J. Lewis, “The European Ceiling on Human Rights”, [2007] 
Public Law 720, 726-738; A. Kavanagh, Constitutional Review 
under the UK Human Rights Act, (CUP, 2009) 153-164.
42  McCaughey & Another, [2011] UKSC 20, [2012].
43  Ibid. 757 (Lady Hale). Also: 769 (Lord Dyson).
44  R. (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator, [2004] UKHL 26 at para. 20 
(Lord Bingham). See Stirn (supra note 39) at p. 67.
45  B. Peters, “Germany’s Dialogue with Strasbourg: Extra-
polating the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Relationship with the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Preventive Detention 
Decision”, (2012) 13 German Law Journal 757, 769.
46  Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 14 December 2007, Boussouar; 
Conseil d’État, 14 December 2007, Planchenault.
47  M. Guyomar, “Conclusions sur Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 
14 décembre 2007, M. Planchenault et Garde des sceaux, ministre 
de la Justice c/ M. Boussouar” [2008] RFDA 87, 100.
48  M. Andenas & E. Bjorge, “L’application de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l’homme: quel rôle pour le juge interne”, 
[2012] Revue internationale de droit comparé 384, 405-406; 
M. Guyomar, “Le dialogue des jurisprudences entre le Conseil 
d’État et la Cour de Strasbourg: appropriation, anticipation, 
émancipation”, in: La conscience des droits: Mélanges en l’honneur 
de Jean-Paul Costa, (Dalloz, 2011) 317-318.
49  Tyrer (supra note 9).
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The question of evolutionary interpretation bleeds 
into another important question, one which has come to 
the fore especially in French and UK law. Evolutionary 
interpretation may at times segue into what is no more 
than taking seriously the underlying principles of the 
ECHR in a type of case which has not hitherto come 
before the Strasbourg Court. It is clear enough that to 
shelter behind the fact that, on a particular Convention 
issue, the Strasbourg Court has not so far spoken would 
not be a satisfactory approach to the ECHR. That would 
mean potentially tempering the impact of ECHR law in all 
those cases which had not, on identical or similar facts to 
those of which a domestic court is seized, come up before 
the Strasbourg Court. By applying a principled approach, 
the courts avoid using any dearth of Strasbourg authority 
on an issue as a pretext for refusing to give effect to a right 
which otherwise seems undeniable.50
Even if the content of an ECHR right must, in terms of 
its international meaning, be determined by the Strasbourg 
Court, that does not mean that there can be no variation in 
the manner in which it fi nds expression in the jurisprudence 
of national courts .51 While it is true that the national 
courts are at pains to keep pace with Strasbourg, it is not 
so that the national courts in France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom choose to remain stationary in situations 
where the Strasbourg Court has not taken a pace which 
would allow national courts to fall into step beside it.52 In 
part this is because the national courts take seriously 
the responsibility resting upon them, according to the 
principle of subsidiarity,53 to be the fi rst-line defenders of 
the Convention rights, or as commissaire du gouvernement 
Mattias Guyomar put it in Boussouar & Planchenault, 
it means simply that the courts aim to ‘give full effect to 
the subsidiary character of the control of the Strasbourg 
Court, taking charge of giving full effect before national 
authorities to Convention rights’.54
This is an area in which the development of domestic 
standards (which may well take colour from those of 
the ECHR and indeed other international law) and the 
standards of the ECHR (which may well take colour from 
the legal culture of the court applying it and adding to its 
development) tends to become elided.55
Lord Kerr has said about the UK courts that ‘even if 
a case can be made that in the past we were excessively 
deferential to Strasbourg, there are recently clear and 
vigorous signals that we are no longer’.56 The approach 
taken by the Supreme Court seems to bear this proposition 
out.57 Lord Bingham in JJ held that the task of the national 
courts in applying the ECHR is ‘to give fair effect, on the 
facts of this case, to the principles which the Strasbourg 
court has laid down’.58 To the extent that these words are 
in need of any gloss, that was provided by Lord Bingham 
when he, in his fi nal article, said of JJ specifi cally, and the 
way in which the UK courts will rely on the ECHR as set 
out in the Strasbourg jurisprudence generally, that what the 
courts will do is ‘to ascertain the true governing principle 
and apply it’. Lord Bingham did not see JJ as falling foul 
of his own Ullah principle; nor did he see the case as an 
outlier: ‘this is not an example cherry-picked to make this 
point: it is an example repeated over and over’.59 That must 
be right: it is even arguable that already in Ullah the House 
of Lords followed just this approach.60 
If once they did so in the past, the national courts do 
not anymore hesitate to resolve the question of whether a 
claim to a Convention right is viable where there is no clear 
current view from Strasbourg to be seen. They choose the 
interpretation that most closely accords with their reasoned 
view of the content of the Convention right; the national 
courts do not see themselves as relieved of their duty to 
confront the question of the content of a claimed right. 
It seems that one can conclude from the jurisprudence of 
the national courts that the absence of clear jurisprudence 
from the Strasbourg Court on an issue will not alone supply 
the answer to whether a claimed Convention right has 
the content contended for.61 By taking such a principled 
approach to the ECHR as a fl oor, the national courts in 
reality also provide an answer to the questions which have 
been posed as to whether the ECHR rights ought to be 
seen as a ceiling too.62
An additional aspect of this theme merits mention. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice held in Access 
to German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia that when 
the Court made an interpretation of a treaty provisions, ‘in 
accordance with the rules of law, the interpretation given by 
the Court to the terms of the Convention has retrospective 
effect – in the sense that the terms of the Convention must 
be held to have always borne the meaning placed upon 
them by this interpretation’.63 Or as Alain Pellet has put it, 
when a court gives an interpretation to a treaty, that treaty 
‘est réputé avoir toujours eu la signifi cation fournie par 
cette interpretation’.64 A similar approach has been taken 
by the Norwegian Supreme Court, in a case where Justice 
Møse (who later became a Judge of the Strasbourg Court) 
gave the judgment of the court. Confronted with the 
question of whether companies are covered by protections 
regarding self-incrimination contained in Article 6, the 
court had been told by counsel for the government that, 
50  E. Bjorge, “The Courts and the ECHR: A Principled 
Approach to the Strasbourg Jurisprudence”, (2013) 72 CLJ 289, 
299-300.
51  R. (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v. Ministry 
of Justice, [2014] UKSC 38 at para. 69 (Lord Neuberger); Re P 
(Adoption: Unmarried Couple), [2008] UKHL 38 at paras. 33-36 
(Lord Hoffmann).
52  B. Kerr, “The UK Supreme Court: The Modest Underworker 
of Strasbourg?”, lecture, 25 January 2012, at p. 5, www.supremecourt.
uk/docs/speech_120125.pdf.
53  See R. (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v. 
Ministry of Justice, [2014] UKSC 38 at para. 74 (Lord Neuberger).
54  M. Guyomar (supra note 47). Also: Conseil d’État, 
17 February 1995, Marie & Hardouin (especially in the conclusions 
of commissaire du gouvernement Frydman); B. Stirn, D. Fairgrieve, 
and M. Guyomar, Droits et libertés en France et au Royaume-Uni, 
(Odile Jacob, 2006) 251.
55  Stirn (supra note 39) at pp. 147-148; E. Bjorge, “Common 
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(2016) 75 CLJ 220; P. Craig, UK, EU and Global Administratve 
Law: Foundations and Challenges, (CUP, 2015) 271-285; S. Sedley, 
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Law, (CUP, 2015) 193-208.
56  Kerr (supra note 52) at p. 1.
57  Limbuela, [2005] UKHL 66; Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45 at para. 19; Re G 
(Adoption: Unmarried Couple) sub nom Re P, [2008] UKHL 38; 
EM (Lebanon), [2008] UKHL 64; Quila & Another, [2011] UKSC 
45; Rabone & Another v. Pennine Care NHS Trust, [2012] UKSC 2.
58  Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] 
UKHL 45 at para. 19 (Lord Bingham).
59  T. Bingham, “The Human Rights Act: A View from the 
Bench”, [2010] EHRLR 568, 573; Lives of the Law: Selected Essays 
and Speeches 2000-2010, (OUP, 2011) 183-184.
60  E. Bjorge (supra note 50) at pp. 291-293; M. Andenas & 
E. Bjorge, “Ambrose: Is the Ullah Principle Wrong?”, (2012) 
128 LQR 319, 322-323. Cf. P. Sales, “Strasbourg Jurisprudence and 
the Human Rights Act”, [2012] Public Law 253.
61  See for example Ambrose v. Harris, [2011] UKSC 43; Kerr 
(supra note 52) at p. 17.
62  Cf. P. Sales, “Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the Human Rights 
Act”, [2012] PL 253.
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PCIJ Ser A/B No. 40, 19.
64  A. Pellet et al., Droit international public, (8th edn., LGDJ, 
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were it to reach such a conclusion, it would leap ahead of 
the Strasbourg Court, whose case-law on this particular 
question was sparse. Justice Møse, correctly it would seem, 
took the view that this was not necessarily a matter of 
evolutionary or dynamic interpretation: it was simply a 
matter of straight down the line operation of the various 
means of interpretation.65 Not everything that glimmers is 
gold; not everything that is new is evolutionary or dynamic.
II. Where Next for the Living Instrument?
On the basis of the Strasbourg Court’s past jurisprudence 
regarding the forward-looking ‘living instrument’ 
approach, the question could well be asked, Where might 
the living instrument doctrine take the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court in the future? This part of the article tests 
a number of hypotheses as to where the living instrument 
approach could take the Court in future years.
1. Systemic Integration and the Living Instrument 
Approach
One aspect of the living instrument approach is, as the 
International Court of Justice observed in Namibia, that 
‘an international instrument has to be interpreted and 
applied within the framework of the entire legal system 
prevailing at the time of the interpretation’.66 
This, of course, has not been lost on the Strasbourg 
Court, which in numerous cases has been prepared to take 
seriously Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT).67 There is certainly scope in the 
text of the ECHR for such an approach, even apart from 
the general exhortation in its Preamble towards the ‘further 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.68 
One general and one specifi c example could be given.
A general licence given by the text of the Convention for 
such an approach is set out in Article 53, which provides, in 
pertinent part, that: ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall be 
construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured ... 
under any other agreement to which it is a Party’. This clause, 
together with cognate clauses in other human rights treaties, 
has been called an example of ‘mobile priority’: ‘Examples 
of mobile priority can be found in article 53 of the ECHR. 
It provides for the priority of the human rights instrument 
offering the wider protection. The ECHR would thus prevail 
for the parties when it offers a greater protection’.69 It 
provides an attractive and as yet largely untapped textual 
resource for the further realisation of the rights of the ECHR.
A more specifi c licence could be thought to have been 
given by the text of the ECHR in those four provisions 
of the Convention text which explicitly incorporate 
general international law, that is, the fi rst sentence of 
Article 7(1) on no punishment without law;70 Article 15, 
on derogation in time of emergency;71 Article 35, on the 
Court’s admissibility criteria;72 and Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1, on the protection of property. The fi nal of those four 
provisions relates to a fi eld of law which has, over the last 
few decades, undergone considerable development, and it 
is, according to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, 
as a conduit into the Convention of developments of what 
the provision terms ‘general principles of international 
law’ one which holds out great promise. 
The text of Article 1(1) of Protocol No. 1 provides that: 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest and subject 
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.’73 In James v. United 
Kingdom and Lithgow v. United Kingdom, both of which 
concerned UK nationals,74 the Strasbourg Court, sitting in 
its Plenary formation, observed that ‘the general principles 
of international law’, to which Article 1 of Protocol 1 makes 
explicit reference, whilst they could not apply in respect of 
nationals, ‘are incorporated into that Article ... as regards 
those acts to which they are normally applicable, that is 
to say acts of a State in relation to non-nationals’.75 The 
fact that these general principles do indeed apply to non-
nationals was also emphasised (in a document available only 
in French) by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe when it opened the Protocol for signature: 
‘Reconnaissant, en ce qui concerne l’article Ier du Protocole, 
que les principes généraux du droit international, dans leur 
acceptation actuelle, comprennent l’obligation de verser aux 
non-nationaux une indemnité en cas d’expropriation’.76 
For the applicants in James and Lithgow that meant that 
they could fi nd no succour in general international law; 
but the Strasbourg Court made it clear that the general 
principles of international law do indeed apply to acts of a 
State in relation to non-nationals. Whilst one might quibble 
with the conclusion in relation to nationals, there can be 
no cavil with the Court’s conclusion in relation to non-
nationals: there is no doubt, according to the clear wording 
of Article 1, that the article does incorporate general 
international law into its scope and that non-nationals 
must be able to benefi t from that incorporation. Going 
back to the point mentioned about Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention above, such an incorporation would 
have been there even in the absence of the textual conduit 
of Article 1. Thus, even in cases which have concerned 
expropriation of the property of nationals, the Court has 
65  Rt. 2011 p. 800 at para. 53.
66  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J. Rep. 1971, pp. 16, 
35 at para. 53.
67  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331; (1969) 8 ILM 679.
68  J.P. Costa, La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme: des 
juges pour la liberté, (Dalloz, 2013) 43.
69  R. Kolb, The Law of Treaties, (Edward Elgar, 2016) 188-189.
70  “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal 
offence under national or international law at the time when it was 
committed.”
71  “In time of war or other public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures 
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law.”
72  “The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic 
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally 
recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six 
months from the date on which the fi nal decision was taken.”
73  See generally J.A. Frowein, “The Protection of Property”, in: 
R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher & H. Petzold (eds.), The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, (Nijhoff, 1993) 515.
74  In Lithgow there was initially a French national among 
the applicants, Mrs Monique Augustin-Normand: but, as she 
was among those applicants whose complaints were declared 
inadmissible by the Commission, her complaint was not heard on 
the merits (Lithgow and Others v. United Kingdom, no. 9006/80, 
8 July 1986, at §§ 2 and 102).
75  James v. United Kingdom, 8793/79, 21 February 1986, at § 61. 
See J.-F. Flauss, “Nationalisation et indemnisation préférentielle de 
la propriété étrangère dans le cadre de la Convention européenne 
des droits de l’homme”, Gazette du Palais, 27 November 1986, 
pp. 729, 731.
76  See also Commentary by the Secretariat-General on the 
Draft Protocol of 18 September 1951, Doc DH (57) 10 at 157 (“the 
phrase ‘subject to the conditions provided for ... by the general 
principles of international law’ would guarantee compensation to 
foreigners, even if it were not paid to nationals”).
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held that, ‘[i]n this connection, international case-law, of 
courts or arbitration tribunals, affords the Court a precious 
source of inspiration’.77 The fact that Article 1 actually sets 
this out in its text makes the point a fortiori.
The Strasbourg Court in James v. United Kingdom 
explained why it would be correct as a matter of principle to 
treat non-nationals and nationals differently in the context 
of expropriation. The Court determined that Article 14 
of the Convention and its prohibition of discrimination 
did not pose a problem in this connection: ‘the Court has 
consistently held that differences of treatment do not 
constitute discrimination if they have an “objective and 
reasonable justifi cation”’,78 which the Court held to be 
the case with difference of treatment in connection with 
compensation for expropriation. The Court went on to say:
Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the 
context of a social reform, there may well be good grounds 
for drawing a distinction between nationals and non-
nationals as far as compensation is concerned. To begin 
with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic 
legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have played 
no part in the election of designation of its authors nor 
have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly, although 
a taking of property must always be effected in the public 
interest, different considerations may apply to nationals 
and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason 
for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the 
public interest than non-nationals.79 
The same point has been made in more recent cases in 
the context of investor-State arbitrations, such as in Lemire 
v. Ukraine, where a Tribunal set up under the auspices of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) observed that: ‘this unequal treatment 
is not without justifi cation: justice is not to grant everyone 
the same, but suum cuique tribuere. Foreigners, who lack 
political rights, are more exposed than domestic investors to 
arbitrary actions of the host State and may thus, as a matter 
of legitimate policy, be granted a wider scope of protection.’80 
But how might those principles contribute to the 
development and further realisation of the rights of the 
Convention? Two aspects of the matter will be dealt with 
here.
First, there can be no doubt whatever that, in respect 
of expropriation of the property of non-nationals, 
these principles require full compensation, not just the 
‘appropriate’ compensation that the Strasbourg Court has 
been content to demand in relation to expropriation of 
the property of nationals. As the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
observed in Sedco v. Iran, there is overwhelming support 
for the conclusion ‘that under customary international law 
in a case such as here presented – a discrete expropriation 
of alien property – full compensation should be awarded 
for the property taken’; ‘[t]his is true whether or not the 
expropriation was otherwise lawful’.81 In Biloune v. Ghana 
an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal chaired by Stephen Schwebel, 
President of the International Court of Justice, held that 
‘[u]nder the principles of customary international law, 
a claimant whose property has been expropriated by a 
foreign State is entitled to full ... compensation’.82 Indeed, 
this is the position customary international law has taken 
since the 1920s, going back to the Award by the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in Norwegian Shipowners’ claim83 and 
the famous Factory at Chorzów judgment of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice,84 but also numerous other 
awards.85
In 1958 Lord McNair, who was the following year to 
become President of the Strasbourg Court, took the view 
that according to the principles of international law a 
State may lawfully take the property of non-nationals only 
when, amongst other things, it makes ‘full compensation 
to the alien thereby affected’.86 Posing the question 
whether it was possible, under general international law, 
even to argue that a non-national who had had his or her 
property expropriated could be given anything ‘less than 
full compensation’, he concluded that he was ‘aware of no 
judicial or arbitral authority whatever for the view that a 
State is entitled to nationalise the property of foreigners on 
condition of paying only partial compensation’.87 
The principles of international law in relation to non-
nationals differ from those of the ECHR in relation to 
nationals in so far as, regardless of how important the reasons 
for the expropriation are, there can be no diminution of the 
compensation that is due to the non-national. As the ICSID 
Tribunal held in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, concerning 
expropriation for a weighty environmental reason: ‘the fact 
that the Property was taken for this reason does not affect 
either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be 
paid for the taking’.88 Similarly, the margin of appreciation 
which the Strasbourg Court relies on in connection with 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 claims of nationals is ‘not found 
in customary international law’ in respect of expropriation 
of non-nationals.89 
There can be little doubt that State practice supports 
this position. The USA in 1976 announced that with 
regard to expropriations of property of US nationals ‘the 
Department of State wishes to place on record its view 
that foreign investors are entitled to the fair market value 
of their interests’.90 Occasioned by certain statements by 
Portugal in relation to the protection of property under 
the ECHR, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France 
in 1979 all made public statements to the effect that ‘the 
general principles of international law require the payment 
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation of the 
expropriation of foreign property’.91 
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That full market value means no less than the ‘fair 
market value’ requirement92 is clear from an abundant 
jurisprudence, such as Sedco v. Iran (‘fair market value’)93 
and Italian Republic v. Federal Republic of Germany 
(Plenary Judgment 131), where the Arbitral Commission 
on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany held that 
full compensation meant that it was ‘the market price at 
the place of dispossession to which the dispossessed is 
entitled’.94 Crucially, in international law this has been 
taken to mean that one has to think away those 
measures taken by the public authorities of the host 
State – the measures which in the aggregate make up 
the nationalization, the expropriation, the dispossession 
– such that ‘fair market value’ means ‘the amount which 
a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller for the 
[property], disregarding any diminution of value due to 
the [taking] itself or the anticipation thereof, and excluding 
consideration of events thereafter that might have 
increased or decreased the value’.95 
There is, as the Court explicitly recognised in James 
and Lithgow, a great difference as between the level of 
compensation the Strasbourg Court affords nationals 
and the level of compensation the general principles 
of international law affords non-nationals. As one 
distinguished Arbitral Tribunal (Reisman, President; 
Frowein, Kraft, Lagarde and van den Berg) put it, in Bank 
for International Settlements, ‘it is true that the jurisprudence 
of the Strasbourg Court has adopted a fl exible standard, 
described as one of “appropriate” compensation for taking 
by a State of the property of its nationals’; but ‘the general 
relevance of human rights law aside, the mainstream of 
general international law’, the Tribunal observed, ‘has 
required full compensation’.96
That must be correct. It could be added that the 
European jurisprudence in this regard has thus far related 
only to nationals,97 whereas the international jurisprudence 
in principle concerns non-nationals. For the reasons given 
by the Strasbourg Court in James, the general principles 
of international law give a higher level of protection to 
non-nationals than the ECHR gives to nationals. This 
could be t hought to mean that there is no disconnect or 
confl ict whatever between the international jurisprudence 
demanding full compensation for non-nationals and 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence that gives less than full 
compensation for nationals. The two sets of case-law 
complement each other, as James acknowledges, each legal 
system taking the correct approach within its respective 
sphere.
Secondly, the question of who is to be deemed a national 
and who is a non-national is of interest. Article 1 of Protocol 
1 is the only article of the Convention to set out on the face 
of its text that it applies to ‘every natural or legal person’; 
there can thus be no cavil with the proposition, long 
recognised by the Court, that Article 1 ‘provides specifi c 
recognition of the general position that corporate bodies 
have rights under the Convention’.98 It is germane in that 
connection that, according to general international law, 
non-nationals who have set up companies in the host State, 
instead of operating through a company incorporated 
abroad, will in certain situations enjoy the same protection 
as they would have done had they been incorporated 
abroad. This is clear from the judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (USA 
v. Italy), where the International Court observed that 
the US American investors Raytheon and Machlett, who 
owned parts of ELSI, according to international law 
enjoyed protection in Italy as non-nationals although their 
company, ELSI, was incorporated in Italy and not abroad.99 
Sir Arthur Watts explained the decision in the following 
way: whilst, up until the 1980s, it was not clear that non-
nationals who have set up a company in the host State, 
instead of electing to operate through a company based 
abroad, fall under the scope of protection of international 
law, ‘the Court proceeded on this basis in Elettronica Sicula 
S.p.A (ELSI): the United States claimed against Italy for 
loss and damage allegedly suffered by two US companies 
as a result of action taken by the Italian authorities against 
an Italian company the shares of which were wholly owned 
by the US companies whose direct rights as shareholders 
were thereby affected’.100 This approach has been taken 
up by other international tribunals, such as the Tribunal in 
Azturix, which observed that, in ELSI, ‘the ICJ accepted 
the protection of foreign shareholders by the State of 
their nationality against the State of incorporation’101 and 
CMS, where the Tribunal observed that ‘the Elettronica 
Sicula decision evidences that the International Court of 
Justice itself accepted ... the protection of shareholders 
of a corporation by the State of their nationality in spite 
of the fact that the affected corporation had a corporate 
personality under the defendant State’s legislation’.102 
Non-nationals who act through a company set up in the 
host State enjoy the protection afforded by international 
law to non-nationals; this result is ‘in accord with the 
general purpose’ of protection of the possessions of 
non-nationals, whether that is guaranteed by treaty or 
customary international law.103 
There can be no doubt that, in respect of non-nationals, 
there is much work to be done before it can be said that 
the Strasbourg Court has given ‘the general principles of 
international law’ their fair due in connection with the 
protection of property. As more applications are directed 
to the Court in relation to the expropriation of non-
nationals, the Court will, on the basis of its approach in 
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286.
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2007, para. 405; El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award, 31 October 2011, paras. 702-703.
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22 November 2002, (2002) 23 RIAA 153, 231 at para. 168.
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James and Lithgow, indubitably give full effect to these 
general principles of international law as developed by 
international courts and tribunals.
2. European Consensus
The nexus between the living instrument approach and 
the interpretative technique codifi ed in Article 31(3)(b) of 
the VCLT is a close one. As the Court observed in A, B & 
C v. Ireland, the existence of a consensus has long played 
a role in the evolution of the Convention provisions from 
Tyrer v. United Kingdom onwards, the Convention being 
considered a ‘living instrument’ to be interpreted in the 
light of present-day conditions: ‘Consensus has therefore 
been invoked to justify a dynamic interpretation of the 
Convention’.104 Similarly, as the Special Rapporteur of 
the International Law Commission (ILC) Georg Nolte 
has observed, the Strasbourg Court ‘frequently relies 
on subsequent practice when it identifi es a “consensus”, 
“vast majority”, “generally recognised rules” or a “distinct 
tendency”’ although it does not explicitly advert to Ar-
ticle 31(3)(b) in that regard.105
Furthermore, the general approach of the Strasbourg 
Court in this connection seems to be in line with Draft 
Conclusion 3 of the ILC106 on subsequent agreements 
and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation 
of treaties, which stipulates: ‘Subsequent agreements or 
subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may assist 
in determining whether or not the presumed intention of 
the parties upon the conclusion of the treaty was to give 
a terms used a meaning which is capable of evolving over 
time.’ As the ILC here brings out, there is nothing special 
about treaty terms being interpreted as having evolved; 
the issue of evolutionary interpretation of treaties is one 
of the correct application of Articles 31-33 VCLT.107 The 
possibility, raised by Judge Ziemele in Rohlena v. Czech 
Republic, that a better way of conceptualizing ‘consensus’, 
in connection with the living instrument approach, is as a 
matter of ‘particular’ or ‘regional’ customary international 
law, will not be developed any further here, although 
it seems to this author a promising avenue for further 
analysis.108
But what is the line that divides what is and what is 
not capable of interpretation under the living instrument 
doctrine, or in other words, what could be termed to be 
living and dead in the European Convention?
In Hassan the Strasbourg Court found that ‘a consistent 
practice on the part of the High Contracting Parties, 
subsequent to their ratifi cation of the Convention, could 
be taken as establishing their agreement not only as 
regards interpretation but even to modify the text of the 
Convention’.109
This interpretation was, according to the Court, 
based on the interpretative techniques codifi ed in Ar-
ticle 31(3)(b)-(c). These considerations did not lead to 
an evolutionary interpretation that heightened the level 
of protection afforded by the Convention; rather, they 
limited or restricted that level of protection. As a matter 
of treaty interpretation under the rules set out in Ar-
ticles 31-33 VCLT, i.e. the ‘gold standard’ of treaty 
interpretation which the Strasbourg Court itself explicitly 
follows, this interpretation was not necessarily wrong in 
principle but was inappropriate by reason of the subsequent 
practice which existed in the case. Before addressing that 
question squarely, however, it is necessary fi rst to touch on 
three other points: fi rst, that Hassan is not the fi rst case in 
which the Grand Chamber has taken an approach which, 
by way of evolution, restricted Convention rights rather 
than expanding them; second, the issue of extraterritorial 
derogation; and, third, the issue of whether, in principle, a 
special regime of treaty interpretation ought to apply to 
provisions such as Article 1 ECHR.
3.  Restricting the Convention’s Protection through 
Evolutionary Interpretation? 
As adumbrated above, Hassan was not the fi rst case 
in which the Court arguably has watered down the level 
of protection fl owing from Article 5. Perhaps the most 
important example is Mangouras v. Spain,110 where, it seems, 
the Grand Chamber (by a majority of 10 to 7) decided to 
lower the protection offered by Article 5 of the Convention 
to the individual claimant, who had caused great harm to 
the environment in the form of an oil spill. The Spanish 
courts had set a bail of three million euros, a sum which 
was, according to the minority of the Grand Chamber, ‘far 
beyond the means of the applicant, with the consequence 
that he continued to be detained on remand for a total of 
eighty-three days’.111 Whilst the case is different in many 
ways, one could see Mangouras as lowering the standards 
of protection in Article 5 of the Convention concerning 
the setting of bail against the applicant. Certainly, Judge 
Tulkens has characterised the judgment as an example of 
how evolutionary interpretation can ‘in some cases, have as 
an effect the restriction of the scope of the rights protected 
by the Convention’.112
The Grand Chamber stated that in principle ‘the 
increasingly high standard being required in the area of 
the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties 
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater fi rmness in 
assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic 
societies’.113 But this did not lead the Grand Chamber to 
the conclusion that the applicant’s rights under Article 5 
had evolved towards a higher level of protection for 
individuals in the applicant’s situation. Instead the Grand 
Chamber stated that it could not ‘overlook the growing 
and legitimate concern both in Europe and internationally 
in relation to environmental offences’.114 The subsequent 
practice in Mangouras was evidenced in particular by 
States’ powers and obligations regarding the prevention 
of maritime pollution and the unanimous determination 
by European States to identify those responsible and to 
impose sanctions on them, sometimes using criminal law 
as a means of enforcing environmental law obligations. 
The Grand Chamber’s analysis in Mangouras fell short 
of the exacting test as to what is subsequent practice 
drawn up by the International Court of Justice: according 
to the International Court, in Kasikili/Sedudu Island, a 
subsequent practice is established only when the parties 
to a treaty, through their authorities, engage in common 
conduct, and that they acted wilfully and with awareness of 
the consequences of their actions.115
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It seems fair to analyse Mangouras as an example of 
an international court shying away from giving to a treaty 
provision an evolutionary interpretation that would have 
gone with the grain of the object and purpose of the treaty, 
and instead found guidance in the subsequent agreements 
and practice of the States, which seemed in the event to go 
in the other direction. In Mangouras, in other words, the 
Grand Chamber gave precedence to subsequent practice 
over the object and purpose, thus avoiding a divergence 
between its own jurisprudence and the practice of States 
Parties.
4. Extraterritorial Derogations?
Second, can it be right for the Strasbourg Court to 
expand jurisdiction without a consonant enlargement 
of the potential for derogation? To state the question 
differently, is it tenable to hold a State accountable because 
it exercises jurisdiction abroad all the while denying it the 
possibility to derogate extraterritorially?
The UK Supreme Court in Abd Ali Hameed Al-Waheed 
& Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence recently 
took the view that it can scarcely be possible to derogate 
extraterritorially,116 and so did the minority of the Grand 
Chamber in Hassan. Simply stated, the obligation to afford 
human rights protection in the context of the external 
exercise of State power is not likely to be amenable to 
derogation. This is so because Article 15 lays down as a 
condition for express derogation that the emergency in 
issue be one which is ‘threatening the life of the nation’. 
The Strasbourg Court in Lawless v. Ireland determined 
that the words ‘refer to an exceptional situation of crisis 
or emergency which affects the whole population and 
constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of 
which the State is composed’.117 Lord Bingham, delivering 
the lead judgment in Al-Jedda, observed that: ‘[i]t is hard to 
think that these conditions could ever be met when a State 
had chosen to conduct an overseas peacekeeping operation, 
however dangerous the conditions, from which it could 
withdraw’.118 Lord Hope, delivering the lead judgment in 
Smith v. Ministry of Defence, observed about the power to 
derogate that ‘[t]he circumstances in which that power can 
properly be exercised are far removed from those where 
operations are undertaken overseas’.119 Before Al-Waheed 
& Serdar Mohammed, Campbell McLachlan summarised 
the legal position thus: ‘[e]ngaging in an overseas military 
or peacekeeping operation, undertaken at the State’s 
election, is most unlikely’ to meet the requisite criteria for 
derogation.120 If the overseas operation is really elective, 
then it is diffi cult to imagine that that would meet the 
criteria of Article 15. These are the views that seem to 
have convinced the Supreme Court in Al-Waheed & Serdar 
Mohammed.
If the Strasbourg Court were to go against the views of the 
leading writers and of the House of Lords and the Supreme 
Court and allow derogations in such circumstances, the 
acceptability of the derogation is likely to depend heavily 
on the impugned facts. One might say that there is a 
difference between the interventions in Libya in recent 
years, and interventions that, if nothing else, came rather 
closer to being prompted by the life of the nation being 
threatened at home. It is certainly not possible to say, ex 
ante, that one can derogate out of all extraterritorial military 
activity undertaken by armed forces; derogation is not an 
on-off switch for human rights obligations. The provision 
provides that the State may take measures derogating from 
its obligations under the Convention only ‘to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’; as is 
clear from A. v. United Kingdom the Strasbourg Court has 
been fastidious in upholding the principle on which Ar-
ticle 15 is based,121 and the Court is likely to follow that 
same approach in respect of overseas military operations.
In any case, derogations in circumstances such as those 
prevailing in Hassan would, as pointed out by Sari and 
Quénivet, come with a series ‘of important limitations, 
including the fact that derogations are incapable of 
displacing the applicability of the Convention as a whole, 
that they are subject to scrutiny by the Strasbourg Court 
and are without prejudice to other applicable rules of 
international law, including other applicable human rights 
norms, and that the rules of the ECHR overlap with those 
of the law of armed confl ict in a number of respects’. 
Derogations therefore should not be regarded as ‘a magical 
panacea’.122
5.  Are there Special Rules for the Interpretation 
of Issues of Jurisdiction?
A question that was addressed by both parties in Hassan 
but which did not come to a head directly in the judgment 
is the correctness or otherwise of what the Court observed 
in Banković123 about evolutionary interpretation and 
Article 1 of the Convention. As the Court stated in that 
case, ‘[i]t is true that the notion of the Convention being 
a living instrument to be interpreted in light of present-
day conditions is fi rmly rooted in the Court’s case-law’. It 
continued by pointing out that it had ‘applied that approach 
not only to the Convention’s substantive provisions ... but 
more relevantly to its interpretation of former Articles 25 
and 46 concerning the recognition by a Contracting State 
of the competence of the Convention organs’. Given, 
however, that ‘the scope of Article 1 ... is determinative of 
the very scope of the Contracting Parties’ obligations and, 
as such, of the scope and reach of the entire Convention 
system of human rights’ protection as opposed to the 
question ... of the competence of the Convention organs to 
examine a case’, the Court in Banković declined to apply 
the living instrument doctrine to the jurisdictional use of 
Article 1. The Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court 
in Banković held that the living instrument doctrine (or 
‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutionary interpretation’) did not apply 
to Article 1, as that Article pertains to jurisdiction.124
It is diffi cult to accept this conclusion on its face. There 
is, as a matter of principle, no reason why special doctrines 
of interpretation should apply to issues of jurisdiction. 
As a matter of international law, Article 1, like any other 
provision of the European Convention, has to be interpreted 
in accordance with the rules set out in Articles 31-33 VCLT. 
No special rules of interpretation apply to jurisdictional 
provisions. As the senior Arbitral Tribunal (Stephen, 
President; Crawford; Schwebel) in Mondev determined:
there is no principle either of extensive or restrictive 
interpretation of jurisdictional provisions in treaties. 
In the end the question is what the relevant provisions 
mean, interpreted in accordance with the applicable 
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rules of interpretation of treaties. These are set out in Ar-
ticles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.125
The Tribunal added: ‘Neither the International Court nor 
other tribunals in the modern period apply any principle 
of restrictive interpretation to issues of jurisdiction.’126
The main point in this connection, however, is a very 
simple one: whilst it must be incorrect to say, as the Court 
did in Banković, that special rules of treaty interpretation 
should apply to Article 1, it is also wrong to think that the 
concept of jurisdiction that the Court now relies on has 
somehow evolved since the Convention’s inception. Rather, 
what is at issue here is the straight-forward application of 
a concept that, although it was confused in Banković,127 has 
always been there and is not so much evolving as fi nally 
being allowed fully to apply.
6.  Was the Interpretative Result in Hassan Supported 
by the Subsequent Practice of States?
Turning, then, to the main issue to which Hassan gives 
rise, how convincing is the claim of consistency of the 
interpretative result in Hassan with the VCLT?
First, it is worth pointing out that the result in Hassan was 
in no way a novel one; the Commission had already reached 
it in 1976 in Cyprus v. Turkey, where the Commission had 
taken 
account of the fact that both Cyprus and Turkey are 
Parties to the (Third) Geneva Convention of 12 August 
1949... . Having regard to the above, the Commission 
has not found it necessary to examine the question of 
a breach of Article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights with regard to persons accorded the status 
of prisoners of war.128
It is worth recalling, however, as Judge Greenwood 
has done, that the Strasbourg Court has no more than ‘a 
restricted jurisdiction and cannot directly enforce rules 
drawn from outside the body of law which created [it]’.129 
This coheres with the conventional basis of the Strasbourg 
Court’s jurisdiction. Article 19 ECHR establishes the 
Strasbourg Court ‘[t]o ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting 
Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto’. Its 
jurisdiction, according to Article 32(1), ‘shall extend to all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of 
the Convention and the protocols thereto’, Article 32(2) 
adding that ‘[i]n the event of dispute as to whether the 
Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide’. In recent 
times, other international courts and tribunals have taken 
a similar stance to Judge Greenwood’s point. 
The Kishenganga130 Tribunal, in its interpretation of 
the Indian-Pakistani Indus Waters Treaty and Annexures, 
underscored that, in interpreting the treaty, ‘principles 
of international environmental law must be taken into 
account’.131 Paragraph 29 of Annexure G to the Indus 
Waters Treaty, however, made it clear that:
the law to be applied by the Court shall be this Treaty and, 
whenever necessary for its interpretation or application, 
but only to the extent necessary for that purpose, 
the following in the order in which they are listed: 
(a) International conventions establishing rules which 
are expressly recognized by the Parties; (b) Customary 
international law.
Thus the Tribunal noted that ‘the place of customary 
international law in the interpretation and application of 
the Indus Waters Treaty remains subject to Paragraph 29’; 
‘this Treaty expressly limits the extent to which the Court 
may have recourse to, and apply, sources of law beyond 
the Treaty itself’.132 In an important passage, the Tribunal 
concluded that: 
if customary international law were applied not to 
circumscribe, but to negate rights expressly granted in 
the Treaty, this would no longer be ‘interpretation or 
application’ of the Treaty but the substitution of customary 
law in place of the Treaty.133 
That is the danger that other international law is 
‘applied not to circumscribe, but to negate rights expressly 
granted in the Treaty’ which the court in question is 
entitled to interpret and apply. Then the court is no longer 
engaging, to use the wording of Article 32(1) ECHR, 
in the ‘interpretation or application of the Convention 
and the protocols thereto’, but, to use the words of the 
Kishenganga Tribunal, in ‘the substitution’ of international 
humanitarian law ‘in place of’ the ECHR. As was seen 
above, the ECHR does not include the kind of clause that 
the Indian-Pakistani Indus Waters Treaty and Annexures 
included; instead the relationship between the Convention 
and other international law is regulated through Articles 
31-32 VCLT. 
On the basis of those rules of interpretation, the Arbitral 
Tribunal, chaired by Alain Pellet, in RREEF v. Spain, 
created by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),134 and whose 
competence was challenged on the grounds that the EU 
Treaties ousted the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, observed:
‘[I]n case of any contradiction between the ECT and EU 
law, the Tribunal would have to insure full application 
of its “constitutional” instrument, upon which its 
jurisdiction is founded. … It follows from this that, if 
there must be a “hierarchy” between the norms to be 
applied by the Tribunal, it must be determined from the 
perspective of public international law, not of EU law. 
Therefore, the ECT prevails over any other norm (apart 
from those of ius cogens – but this is not an issue in the 
present case).’135
Thus, in Hassan, the Court set out the ‘criterion 
contained in Article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 
in respect of which the ‘Court has made it clear on many 
occasions that the Convention must be interpreted in 
harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part’.136 The Court noted that it had already held that 
Article 2 should be interpreted ‘so far as possible in light 
of the general principles of international law, including 
the rules of international humanitarian law which play an 
indispensable and universally-accepted role in mitigating 
the savagery and inhumanity of armed confl ict’.137
In addition to the criterion contained in Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT came the fact that no Contracting State has 
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purported to derogate from its obligations under Article 5 
ECHR in order to detain, during international armed 
confl icts, persons on the basis of Geneva Convention III 
and IV. Although, as the Court noted both in Banković 
and Hassan, there have been a number of military missions 
involving Contracting States acting extra-territorially since 
their ratifi cation of the Convention, none of these States has 
ever made a derogation pursuant to Article 15 in respect of 
these activities.138 The practice of not lodging derogations 
in respect of detention under Geneva Conventions III and 
IV during international armed confl icts, the Court pointed 
out in Hassan, is mirrored by State practice in relation to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Under this instrument no State has explicitly derogated 
under Article 4 in respect of such detention, even 
subsequent to the Nuclear Weapons and Wall Advisory 
Opinions139 and DRC v. Uganda Judgment,140 where the 
International Court made it clear that States’ obligations 
under the international human rights instruments to which 
they were parties continued to apply in respect of acts done 
by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own 
territory, particularly in occupied territories. 
If it would have been wrong to rely only on extraneous 
rules of law such as the Geneva Conventions, the 
interpretation that the Strasbourg Court made was 
supported too by the subsequent practice of the parties. 
That takes one dangerously close to the situation described 
by the Kishenganga and RREEF tribunals, i.e. one in which 
the court or tribunal engages not in the interpretation or 
application of the treaty of which it is the arbiter, and which 
gave it its jurisdiction, but instead in the ‘substitution’ of 
other rules of international law ‘in place of the Treaty’.141
Perhaps that would have been the case if other rules of 
international law had been the only means of interpretation 
in favour of the interpretation that the Court made in 
Hassan. As seen above, however, that was not the case, as 
another means of interpretation favouring the result was, 
according to the Court, the subsequent practice on the part 
of all the States Parties. 
This approach was sound in principle. As the ILC 
has recently confi rmed, a subsequent practice is ‘an 
authentic means of interpretation’ consisting ‘of conduct 
in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty’.142 The importance of such 
subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, as an 
element of interpretation, is obvious, as ‘it constitutes 
objective evidence of the understanding of the parties 
as to the meaning of the treaty’.143 On the other hand, 
as the ILC pointed out both in 1964 and in 2013, 
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under 
Article 31(3)(a)-(b) are not the only “authentic means 
of interpretation”. In particular the ordinary meaning of 
the text of the treaty is also such a means “the text of the 
treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of 
the intentions of the parties”.144 By describing subsequent 
practice as an: ‘“authentic” means of interpretation the 
Commission recognizes that the common will of the 
parties, from which any treaty results, possesses a specifi c 
authority regarding the identifi cation of the meaning of the 
treaty, even after the conclusions of the treaty. The Vienna 
Convention thereby accords the parties to a treaty a role 
which may be uncommon for the interpretation of legal 
instruments in some domestic legal systems’.145 In 1964 
Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock was prepared 
in certain circumstances to accord particular – even 
decisive – weight to subsequent practice which is consistent 
and which embraces all the parties:
Subsequent practice when it is consistent and embraces 
all the parties would appear to be decisive of the meaning 
to be attached to the treaty, at any rate when it indicates 
that the parties consider the interpretation to be binding 
upon them. In these cases, subsequent practice as an 
element of treaty interpretation and as an element 
in the formation of a tacit agreement overlap and the 
meaning derived from the practice becomes an authentic 
interpretation established by agreement.146
The ILC in 2013 confi rmed this approach to the 
extent that it observed that: ‘subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the 
parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty must be 
conclusive regarding such interpretation when “the parties 
consider the interpretation to be binding upon them”’.147
That, according to the Strasbourg Court’s description 
of the practice of the States Parties, was the case in 
Hassan. In the Court’s view, all the States Parties seemed 
to consider the interpretation to be binding upon them. 
The subsequent practice in question in Hassan was, the 
Court held, consistent and embraced all the parties to the 
Convention, as ‘no Contracting State has purported to 
derogate from its obligations under Article 5 in order to 
detain, during international armed confl icts, persons on 
the basis of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions’.148 
Arguably, in such as case, to use Sir Humphrey Waldock’s 
words, ‘subsequent practice as an element of treaty 
interpretation and as an element in the formation of a 
tacit agreement overlap and the meaning derived from the 
practice becomes an authentic interpretation established 
by agreement’.
As a matter of treaty interpretation the approach the 
Court took in Hassan is possible in principle, but only if one 
accepts that the failure of the Member States to derogate 
extraterritorially met the threshold as regards subsequent 
practice – a point that can certainly be doubted. Could it 
not be that some States failed to derogate because they 
thought – à tort ou à raison – the Convention would not 
apply in Hassan type cases? Could others, equally, have 
felt that purporting to derogate could have amounted to 
agreement that the Convention ought to bind in this type 
of case? Did the States in this regard act wilfully and with 
awareness of the consequences of their actions?
Another issue is that some States, Germany being one, 
refrained from detaining any individuals in Afghanistan,149 
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149  Declaration in the Seventh Report by the Federal 
Government on its Human Rights Policy in the Context of Foreign 
Relations and in Other Policy Areas (BT-Drs. 15/5800 ...). In the 
ICRCs Customary IHL database, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
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as they in fact assumed that they were bound by human 
rights obligations in situations such as those at issue in 
Hassan.150
Whilst, in principle, subsequent practice could 
legitimately lead to the kind of extreme interpretative 
results which was the outcome in Hassan – an interpretation 
that is plainly contra legem – it is far from clear that the 
requisite practice actually obtained in Hassan.
There are other limits to such an approach, too, such 
as the one set out in the judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in Whaling in the Antarctic. There the 
International Court found that the functions which 
the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling151 conferred on the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) had ‘made the Convention an evolving 
instrument’.152 The Court observed that ‘amendments to 
the Schedule and recommendations by the IWC may put 
an emphasis on one or the other objectives pursued by 
the Convention, but cannot alter its object and purpose’.153 
In line with this approach, the subsequent practice of the 
Contracting States to the ECHR may put an emphasis 
on one or other of the objectives pursued by the ECHR; 
but it cannot be allowed to alter the Convention’s object 
and purpose. Whilst it would seem that Hassan is within 
the outer bounds drawn up by the International Court, in 
that it scarcely altered the very object and purpose of the 
Convention, the interpretation that the Strasbourg Court 
made might nevertheless be thought to have been an 
unsatisfactory one.
III. Conclusion
If one compares with the approaches taken to legal 
interpretation by European domestic courts and other 
international courts and tribunals, there is little that 
is special about the living instrument approach of the 
Strasbourg Court. As the Court continues to develop its 
living instrument approach, and its interpretation of the 
Convention more broadly, it should do so in a way that 
is closely wedded to the text of the Convention. For the 
purposes of the development of the Convention through 
interpretation and application, there is much interpretative 
mileage in the text of the Convention’s Preamble, in Ar-
ticle 53 and in specifi c material provisions such as Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1. The recitals in the Preamble and the 
provisions referred to open up for a living instrument 
approach that is fi rmly rooted in the text of the Convention. 
The real danger for the development of the interpretation 
of the Convention lies in contra legem interpretations 
such as the one the Strasbourg Court made in Hassan 
and Banković. In that regard the Strasbourg Court should 
take to heart the classic dictum of the International Court, 
which can apply no less to the European Court than to the 
International: ‘It is the duty of the Court to interpret’, ‘not 
to revise’, the Convention.154 
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